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Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return
- Edited by Anthony C. Infanti
- Bridget J. Crawford
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- Book:
- Critical Tax Theory
- Published online:
- 04 August 2010
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- 22 June 2009, pp 224-230
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Summary
The songs tell us that when two people are in love, their souls unite; their two hearts beat as one. The Code also tells us that their two tax liabilities can be as one, united in a joint tax return – but only if they are not simply in love, but are also married. While tax theorists have debated the appropriateness of the joint return, they have not examined the premise behind the joint return: that married people – and only married people – share not only their hopes and dreams, but also their money.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF ASSET POOLING AND CONTROL SHARING
The theoretical justification for the joint return – the belief that married couples share resources – is largely unsupported by empirical evidence. Recently, however, a number of studies have explored intrafamily allocations because of a growing recognition of this issue's importance to a wide array of social welfare programs. These studies indicate “that individual incomes are not simply pooled and then spent to meet household needs in some unified fashion. Rather, they are spent at least in part according to the earner's own preference.” This apportionment phenomenon is true even when the couple states that they pool or share resources.
I examined three studies of intrafamily resource allocation as well as my own. My study was an anonymous ninety-three question survey that was distributed twice. The three prior intrafamily studies I examined were the vast study in the 1983 book American Couples by Philip Blumstein and Pepper Schwartz, a small 1986 study of dual-career couples in the greater Chicago area by Rosanna Hertz, and an English study of 102 married couples conducted specifically on the issue of money and marriage by Jan Pahl.
The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction
- Edited by Anthony C. Infanti
- Bridget J. Crawford
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- Book:
- Critical Tax Theory
- Published online:
- 04 August 2010
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- 22 June 2009, pp 28-38
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This title is not exactly true; it's not exactly false either. It contains a truth that has been shaped by my preferences (or, if you wish, my biases, philosophy, or prejudices) and by my desire to grab the reader's attention and force him (and I mean him) to reach a specific conclusion. It is, in short, rhetoric. In that respect it is not unlike many of the arguments now popularly raised against the progressive income tax. My argument differs from many others in its open acknowledgment of the use of rhetoric.
The progressive income tax is currently under siege. This is a new phenomenon: new not in the fact of the opposition itself, but in the extent of the opposition. In 1913, the general public, economists, and politicians argued about the exact schedule of rates and exemptions, but the idea of graduated or progressive rates was accepted with surprising ease and generally has remained unquestioned ever since. The economic and political consensus about progressivity began to fall apart sometime in the 1970s. Two alternatives to progressivity gained strength: a modified flat or proportionate income tax and an expenditure- or consumption-based tax. An expenditure-based tax proved politically unacceptable but the (modified) flat tax alternative gained strength and culminated in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The drastic erosion of support for progressivity spurred the writing of this article. Before we consent to this erosion we should reevaluate the arguments upon which it is based.
Neoconservative philosophy, with its belief in the primacy of individual rights, both leads to and is supported by the belief in the efficacy of the market as the means to achieve each person's rights and satisfactions most fully.
A Taxing Woman: The Relationship of Feminist Scholarship to Tax
- Edited by Anthony C. Infanti
- Bridget J. Crawford
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- Book:
- Critical Tax Theory
- Published online:
- 04 August 2010
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- 22 June 2009, pp 176-182
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A recent law review article described me as a “feminist tax scholar.” The description made me pause; then my pausing made me wonder: Why was I hesitant about this label? I do, after all, consider myself both a tax scholar and a feminist. What was it, then, about the combination that made me pause?
My hesitancy stems, I believe, from two sources. First, I am not sure what the label “feminist tax scholar” means. Second, whatever the definition is, the mere fact of labeling makes me uneasy. Labels in general worry me because they are rhetorical tools that can, like any rhetorical tool, too easily change from being an aid to communication into a barrier by substituting reaction for thought. At the very least, labels frequently alter the way people perceive the labeled object. What purpose does this particular label serve and does it alter the perception of my work and, by implication, that of other feminist tax scholars?
This article explores my puzzlement and in so doing explores the relationship between feminist scholarship and tax by examining two of my articles that some people have described as feminist. Their themes are most commonly described by others as progressivity of income tax rates and the realities and assumptions underlying joint filing for married couples under the income tax, respectively. Each, however, in fact has other concerns and themes as well. The concept of rhetoric, for example, runs through both. The progressive piece, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction (Income Tax Rhetoric) [see Chapter 2], has a section that explicitly applies feminist theory to the issue of progressive income tax. It has been called a feminist article by many people.
A Legislator Named Sue: Re-Imagining the Income Tax
- Edited by Anthony C. Infanti
- Bridget J. Crawford
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- Book:
- Critical Tax Theory
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- 04 August 2010
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- 22 June 2009, pp 75-81
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When America's Founding Fathers gathered to establish the legal framework for the new republic, Abigail Adams wrote to her husband John Adams asking him to “remember the ladies.” For countless generations lawmaking had occurred this way; when the vote was called, the answering voices were always male. Women were heard only indirectly through the men. Centuries later, a few of those voices are finally female. Now that a woman can directly influence legislation, the question is whether her voice makes a difference. The answer is yes. Studies indicate that women legislators, regardless of whether they are feminists, act differently from male ones, and this difference affects the legislative process as well as policy outcomes. As a consequence, the presence of female legislators makes a difference not only for women, but for men as well.
That the mere existence of women legislators would make such a difference should not be surprising. The force of gender is both everywhere and nowhere. It is everywhere, affecting how people dress, walk, talk, work, and play; how people structure society; and how they think about themselves and about others. It is also nowhere, however, because much of gendered behavior is invisible. It is hidden behind the guise of universality imposed by male dominance, which is one of the few consistent manifestations of gender throughout recorded history.
Tax laws are no different. The Code, for example, as part of the codified federal laws, incorporates § 1, Title 1 of the United States Code, which states “He includes she.” Although the Code generally avoids this obviously gendered language through its use of the unisex “taxpayer,” there are still many substantively gendered aspects of the tax laws.
Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase Compliance?
- Marjorie E. Kornhauser
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- Journal:
- Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence / Volume 18 / Issue 1 / January 2005
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 20 July 2015, pp. 95-117
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- January 2005
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Publicity of information is a fundamental principle of American democracy. Not only is it instrumental in increasing compliance with the laws, a necessity of any government, but also it is an essential element of the right to know-which itself is an aspect of the first amendment right to free speech. Unfortunately, publicity often conflicts with another fundamental right-the right to privacy. In regards to taxes, citizens essentially have two rights to know: a right to know what the tax laws are, and a right to know that these laws are being administered fairly. Publicity in the tax context traditionally means making tax return information public records in an attempt to ensure the fair administration of the tax laws. This type of publicity, however, generates intense hostility because taxpayers perceive it as a huge invasion of their privacy.
After examining the pros and cons of traditional publicity of tax information, this Essay suggests that tax publicity be reconceived more broadly. Redefined in the dictionary sense of simply the transmission of information, tax publicity can include a wide array of communications, varying as to content and audience, which can better achieve publicity’s underlying goals with minimal invasions of privacy. A large portion of publicity in this broad sense can be-and should be-educational.
The Essay outlines four publicity proposals to stimulate discussion. Three use the expanded definition of publicity and focus on individual taxpayers: an annual tax statement, a short booklet to accompany the 1040, called Know Your Taxes, and an annual W-4. These essentially educational programs should deliver tax information to taxpayers more effectively than currently occurs. The fourth, more controversial, proposal suggests partial publicity-in the traditional sense. It attempts, however, to minimize the customary objections to publicizing tax return information by reducing invasions of privacy.
All the proposals will cost money, but probably less than the costs of enforcing compliance only through increased audits and litigation. They may also have psychic and political costs. Although recent studies show that more informed taxpayers are often more compliant, some of the information may trigger negative attitudes which would decrease compliance and/or create pressure for lower taxes.
Regardless of whether taxpayer reactions to the increased information are positive or negative, the greater publicity proposed in the Essay could have salutary effects, especially if it occurred in the context of a rational debate by elected officials about tax policy (instead of the current inflammatory rhetorical sound bites). On the one hand, if taxpayers respond positively to publicity, compliance will increase. If they act negatively, and their hostility to taxes increase, at least the publicity will arm them with more precise information that will allow them to focus their objections to the income tax and thereby lobby more effectively for real tax reform.